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During August 2007–February 2008, the novel Bun-
dibugyo ebolavirus species was identiﬁ   ed during an out-
break of Ebola viral hemorrhagic fever in Bundibugyo 
district, western Uganda. To characterize the outbreak as 
a requisite for determining response, we instituted a case-
series investigation. We identiﬁ  ed 192 suspected cases, of 
which 42 (22%) were laboratory positive for the novel spe-
cies; 74 (38%) were probable, and 77 (40%) were negative. 
Laboratory conﬁ  rmation lagged behind outbreak veriﬁ  cation 
by 3 months. Bundibugyo ebolavirus was less fatal (case-
fatality rate 34%) than Ebola viruses that had caused pre-
vious outbreaks in the region, and most transmission was 
associated with handling of dead persons without appropri-
ate protection (adjusted odds ratio 3.83, 95% conﬁ  dence 
interval 1.78–8.23). Our study highlights the need for main-
taining a high index of suspicion for viral hemorrhagic fevers 
among healthcare workers, building local capacity for labo-
ratory conﬁ  rmation of viral hemorrhagic fevers, and institu-
tionalizing standard precautions.
E
bola hemorrhagic fever (EHF) is a severe, often fatal 
disease of humans and nonhuman primates caused by 
a single-stranded RNA virus belonging to the Filoviridae 
family. The virus was ﬁ  rst isolated in 1976 after hemor-
rhagic fever outbreaks in Zaire and Sudan that resulted in 
>250 deaths (1,2). Before the outbreak described here, 4 
distinct species of Ebola virus were known: Zaire ebolavi-
rus, Sudan ebolavirus, Côte d’Ivoire ebolavirus, and Res-
ton ebolavirus.
Although the reservoirs for the virus and mechanisms 
of transmission have not been fully elucidated, a recent 
study reported that 4% of bats from Gabon were positive 
for Zaire Ebola virus immunoglobulin (Ig) G (3). Initial 
human infection presumably occurs when humans are ex-
posed to infected body ﬂ  uids of the animal reservoir or 
intermediate host. Thereafter, person-to-person transmis-
sion occurs through direct contact with body ﬂ  uids of an 
infected person (1,2,4). After an incubation period of 1–21 
days (1,2,5), an acute febrile illness develops in infected 
persons; the disease is characterized by the sudden onset 
of fever, chills, headache, and myalgia, followed later by 
rash, sore throat, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and abdomi-
nal pain (1,2,5). Approximately half of infected persons 
manifest hemorrhagic signs, e.g., bleeding from the nasal 
cavity, passing of blood in the urine, and/or gastrointestinal 
and vaginal bleeding (5,6). The case-fatality rate (CFR) for 
Zaire Ebola virus and Sudan Ebola virus (SEBOV) infec-
tions varies from 53% to 90% (7). The ﬁ  rst EHF outbreak 
in Uganda occurred in 2000 and affected Gulu, Masindi, 
and Mbarara districts, with a total of 425 case-patients and 
224 deaths (CFR 53%). The outbreak was caused by the 
Sudan ebolavirus species (8).
On November 5, 2007, the Uganda Ministry of Health 
(UMOH) received a report of the deaths of 20 persons in 
Bundibugyo district, western Uganda. However, UMOH 
had received initial reports of 2 suspected cases of a febrile 
diarrheal illness on August 2, 2007. A UMOH team inves-
tigated these 2 cases, but the ﬁ  ndings were not conclusive 
because of inadequate in-country laboratory capacity. In the 
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second report, ill persons had an acute febrile hemorrhagic 
illness, and tests conducted by the US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (Atlanta, GA, USA) conﬁ  rmed the 
illness as EHF on November 29, 2007.
Methods
Outbreak Site
Bundibugyo district is located in western Uganda 
(Figure 1). Approximately 60% of the district is covered 
by the Rwenzori Mountains and Semliki National Park and 
Game Reserve, which have a broad range of wildlife, in-
cluding primates. The district has a population of 253,493 
and a population density of 108 persons/km2 (9), 1 hospital, 
and 26 health centers. The main economic activities are co-
coa farming, ﬁ  shing, and tourism. Hunting of wild animals 
is common among settlements near the national park.
Epidemiologic Activities
During November 29, 2007–February 20, 2008, vil-
lage health teams conducted active searches in the commu-
nities through daily door-to-door visits in their respective 
villages while investigation teams of local and international 
experts reviewed case notes at health facilities and veriﬁ  ed 
suspected cases reported by the village health teams. Cases 
were categorized as suspected EHF, probable EHF, and 
conﬁ  rmed EHF (Table 1).The UMOH developed working 
case deﬁ  nitions and established an enhanced surveillance 
system for identifying suspected case-patients in the af-
fected district and in contiguous districts. 
Investigative Activities
Investigation teams actively searched for case-patients 
in health facilities and communities and retrospectively re-
viewed hospital records. Increased awareness of the disease 
through public education campaigns and the media facili-
tated reporting of suspected cases to health authorities. Vil-
lage health teams assisted in case identiﬁ  cation and reports 
and contact follow-up at the community level. Clinical and 
epidemiologic data were systematically collected from per-
sons with suspected, probable, and conﬁ  rmed cases. Proxies 
(usually parents, spouses, or adult siblings) were interviewed 
for information about case-patients who had died before an 
interview could be conducted. Persons with suspected cases 
identiﬁ  ed in the community were transported by a mobile 
ambulatory team to designated isolation facilities. A triage 
desk was established in the outpatient departments of each 
health facility in the district to screen for suspected cases 
and notify the surveillance system. Clinical specimens, in-
cluding blood, were collected for laboratory testing from all 
persons with suspected EHF. All contacts were entered into, 
and follow-up schedules were drawn by using, the Field In-
formation Management System database (10).
Laboratory Methods
Five milliliters of blood was collected from all persons 
with suspected EHF at least 4 days after symptom onset 
when possible. Specimens initially were transported to the 
Uganda Virus Research Institute (UVRI) and then trans-
ferred to US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
for laboratory analysis. However, on December 4, a labora-
tory was set up at UVRI, and subsequent specimens were 
tested there, as described by Towner et al. (11). Virus isola-
tion was not attempted at UVRI.
Data Analysis
We used Epi Info software version 3.4 (12) to create 
a database into which information from individual case in-
vestigation forms was entered and updated daily. The age 
and sex population structure and projections for Bundibu-
gyo district were obtained from the population and housing 
census 2002 data (9), and attack rates were computed by 
using the district population projections. Current geograph-
ic maps were obtained from the World Health Organization 
Health Mapper Mapping Software, version 4.2 (13).
We tabulated risk factors by case status and calculated 
odds ratios (ORs) using as the reference group persons with 
suspected EHF who had negative test results. To control for 
confounding and to test for effect modiﬁ  cation, we entered 
variables with p values <0.1 into a multivariable logistic 
regression model. By using backward elimination, we 
eliminated all variables that were not statistically signiﬁ  -
cant at p<0.05. The model had the following co-variables: 
admission to hospital or visit with a sick person, consulta-
Figure 1. Major towns and districts in Uganda; districts and major 
towns share the same names. Green shading, national parks; red 
lines, main roads; blue shading, perennial lakes.  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 16, No. 7, July 2010  1089 
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tion with traditional healer, participation in funeral rituals, 
travel to area with cases, contact with a known suspected/
conﬁ  rmed case-patient, contact with wildlife, subcounty 
of residence, age, and sex. The Uganda National Council 
of Science and Technology expedited ethical review and 




UMOH declared an EHF outbreak on November 29. 
Consequently, the National Task Force, composed of both 
local and international partners, was activated to determine 
the magnitude of the outbreak and coordinate immediate 
outbreak response.
All case-patients were treated in isolation wards set up 
in Kampala at the National Referral Hospital, Mulago, and 
in Bundibugyo at Kikyo and Bundibugyo health facilities. 
Health workers on the case-management teams had partici-
pated in patient management during the SEBOV outbreak 
in Gulu in 2000, thus, their experience provided a valuable 
resource during the response. Countrywide social mobili-
zation and health education during the outbreak involved 
developing and disseminating health education materials 
and messages through mobile video shows, community 
meetings with opinion leaders, radio talk shows, and news-
paper inserts.
Index Case Investigation
The putative index patient was a 26-year-old woman 
from Kabango village, Kasitu subcounty, in Bundibugyo 
district. Hunting spears were found at her home, but hunt-
ing as a practice was denied. Fever and general weakness 
developed in this woman, for which she was hospitalized 
on August 1. She delivered a preterm infant the follow-
ing day. Diarrhea and difﬁ  culty breathing developed, but 
hemorrhagic manifestations did not appear. She died on 
August 4.
In this cluster, 9 case-patients and 6 deaths (the neo-
nate, sister, mother, and 2 nieces of the index patient) (CFR 
67%) were reported. The mother and sister were involved 
in nursing and handling the remains of the index patient 
because, at the time, barrier nursing and supervised burials 
had not been initiated. Because these persons were affected 
before the outbreak was conﬁ  rmed, the high CFR was at-
tributable to inadequate supportive care. Three survivors 
were tested; 2 were positive for Bundibugyo ebolavirus–
speciﬁ  c IgG.
Description of Cases
Illnesses in 192 persons met the deﬁ  nition for suspect-
ed EHF. Of these, 42 (22%) were laboratory conﬁ  rmed as 
positive for a novel Ebola virus species (Bundibugyo ebo-
lavirus); 74 (38%) remained probable, and 76 (40%) were 
laboratory negative and classiﬁ  ed as noncases.
Overall, 39 of the 116 persons with conﬁ  rmed and 
probable EHF died (CFR 34%). For male patients, the 
CFR was 35% (23/65) and for females, 31% (16/51). The 
CFR for conﬁ  rmed EHF was 33% (14/42) and for suspect-
ed EHF, 34% (25/74). Case-patients’ ages ranged from 3 
weeks to 70 years (mean 34 years, median 35 years). Most 
40 (36%) case-patients were crop farmers; 14 (12%) were 
healthcare workers.
Symptoms
The median incubation period from contact with an 
infected person to symptom onset was 7 days (range 2–20 
days). The most frequent symptoms were fever (100%), 
intense fatigue (92%), headache (87%), abdominal pain 
Table 1. Case definitions for epidemiologic investigation of EHF 
outbreak, Bundibugyo district, Uganda, 2007–2008* 
Classification Definition
Suspected case  Sudden onset of fever and at least 4 of the 
following symptoms in a resident of or visitor to 
the affected subcounties in Bundibugyo 
district: vomiting, diarrhea, abdominal pain, 
conjunctivitis, skin rash, unexplained bleeding 
from any body part, muscle pain, intense 
fatigue, difficulty swallowing, difficulty 
breathing, hiccups, or headache since August 
1, 2007, OR sudden onset of fever in any 
person who had had contact with a person 
with suspected, probable, or confirmed EHF, 
OR sudden death in a person in the 
community without any other explanation. 
Probable case  Suspected EHF in any person (dead or alive) 
with at least 3 of the following symptoms; 
vomiting, diarrhea, or unexplained bleeding 
from any site, conjunctivitis, or skin rash; AND 
with an epidemiologic link to a person with 
probable or confirmed EHF, OR either no 
specimen collected for laboratory testing or a 
negative laboratory result in a specimen 
collected 0–3 days after onset of symptoms in 
a person with suspected EHF. 
Confirmed case  Laboratory confirmation of infection by 
isolation of virus from any body fluid or tissue, 
OR detection of viral antigen in any body fluid 
or tissue by antigen-detection ELISA, reverse-
transcription–PCR, or immunohistochemistry, 
OR demonstration of serum Ebola virus–
specific IgG antibodies by ELISA, with or 
without IgM, in any person with suspected or 
probable EHF. 
Contact A person who had slept in the same 
household and/or had direct physical contact 
with a person (dead or alive) with suspected, 
probable, or confirmed EHF and/or had been 
exposed to an infected person or to an 
infected person’s secretions, excretions, 
tissues, or linens within 3 weeks after that 
person’s onset of illness. 
*EHF, Ebola hemorrhagic fever; Ig, immunoglobulin. RESEARCH
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(87%), vomiting (83%), and diarrhea (83%). Bleed-
ing manifestations (including hematuria; hematemesis; 
bleeding from the eyes, nose, and vagina; and/or bloody 
stool) occurred in 52% of case-patients, and most (59%) 
case-patients who died had some form of bleeding. Other 
symptoms reported were dysphagia (54% of case-patients), 
dyspnea (52%), and rash (50%). Median duration from 
symptom onset to recovery was 10 days (range 2–26 days). 
Median duration from symptom onset to death was 10 days 
(range 3–21 days).
The outbreak showed 3 successive cycles of transmis-
sion (Figure 2). Each transmission cycle lasted 6 weeks, 
with an interval of 3–11 days, and was characterized by 
a typical epidemic peak followed by gradual decline. The 
highest peak occurred on November 25. Despite the timely 
detection and initiation of investigations during the 30th 
epidemiologic week, the successive transmission cycles in-
dicated delayed laboratory conﬁ  rmation and declaration of 
the outbreak. Outbreak conﬁ  rmation was delayed until the 
48th epidemiologic week, resulting in inadequate control 
measures before the outbreak was conﬁ  rmed.
Geographic Characteristics and Risk Factors
The outbreak was conﬁ   ned to Bundibugyo district. 
More than 97% of cases were detected in 4 of the 10 sub-
counties in the district (Kasitu, Bundibugyo town council, 
Bubukwanga, and Busaru), with >54% of cases occurring 
in Kasitu subcounty (Table 2).
The overall attack rate in the district was 43 
cases/100,000 population. The highest rate occurred in Ka-
situ subcounty, followed by the rate in Bundibugyo town 
council (within Bundibugyo district (Table 2). By sex, the 
attack rate for men was higher than that for women (64 
vs. 47/100,000 population). By age group, the attack rate 
was higher for persons 41–50 years of age than for persons 
51–60 years of age (146 vs. 122/100,000 population).
Analysis of Possible Risk Factors
All case-patients were investigated for exposures 
within 3 weeks before development of symptoms. To bet-
ter determine risk factors for the disease, we conducted a 
bivariate analysis using the 76 non–case-patients as the 
reference group to separately assess persons with prob-
able and conﬁ  rmed EHF (Table 3). Before the institution 
of strict isolation policies, visitors had direct contact with 
patients through shaking of hands, hugging, or contact with 
potentially infected surfaces. Patients with conﬁ  rmed EHF 
(OR 8.71, 95% conﬁ  dence interval [CI] 3.03–26.30) and 
patients with probable and conﬁ  rmed cases combined (OR 
2.56, 95% CI 1.35–4.85) were signiﬁ  cantly more likely to 
have visited sick persons or to have visited the hospital 3 
weeks before becoming sick. Consultation with a tradi-
tional healer within 3 weeks before illness onset was not 
signiﬁ  cantly associated with having EHF (OR 0.16, 95% 
CI 0.01–1.15) (Table 3).
The other risk factor identiﬁ  ed was participation in fu-
neral rituals before onset of illness. The funeral rituals, per-
formed by close relatives, involved washing and dressing 
the body of the decedent. Patients with probable EHF (OR 
Figure 2. Ebola outbreak, by week of onset for probable and 
conﬁ  rmed cases (n = 116), Bundibugyo district, Uganda, August–
December 2007.
Table 2. Geographic distribution of persons with Ebola hemorrhagic fever, Bundibugyo district, Uganda, 2007–2008 
Subcounty  Population No. cases  No. deaths  Case-fatality rate, %  Attack rate* 
Kasitu 33,968 63 18 29 185
Bundibungyo town council  17,590  25 8 32 142
Bubukwanga 23,398  17 7 41 73
Busaru 40,547 8 3 38 20
Harugali 29,162  1 1 100 3
Karugutu 19,384  1 1 100 5
Bubandi 22,063 1 1 100 5
Other subcounties  81,879  0 0 0 0
Total 267,991 116 39 34 43
*Per 100,000 population.   Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 16, No. 7, July 2010  1091 
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3.20, 95% CI 1.55–6.64) and conﬁ  rmed EHF (OR 7.37, 95% 
CI 2.89–19.27) were signiﬁ  cantly more likely than persons 
in the reference group to have participated in funeral ritu-
als before they became sick (Table 3). Similarly, when both 
groups of patients with probable and conﬁ  rmed EHF were 
combined (OR 4.22, 95% CI 2.17–8.24), the members of the 
new group were signiﬁ  cantly more likely to have participat-
ed in funeral rituals before becoming sick (Table 3).
Ebola case-patients were asked whether they had had 
any form of contact with a person known to have suspected 
or conﬁ  rmed EHF. Patients with probable and conﬁ  rmed 
EHF combined were signiﬁ  cantly more likely (OR 2.66, 
95% CI 1.35–5.24) to have had contact with a person 
known to have suspected or conﬁ  rmed EHF before becom-
ing sick (Table 3).
We performed multivariate analysis using binary lo-
gistic regression to control for confounding and to test for 
effect modiﬁ  cation. After backward elimination, participat-
ing in funeral rituals remained as the sole signiﬁ  cant risk 
factor associated with being a probable/conﬁ  rmed case-
patient (adjusted OR 3.83, 95% CI 1.78–8.23).
Discussion
The EHF epidemic in Bundibugyo district in western 
Uganda during August 1, 2007–February 20, 2008, was 
caused by a new species of the virus, Bundibugyo ebola-
virus. It most likely was transmitted from wildlife located 
within Semliki National Park. The median incubation peri-
od of 1 week was less than that reported previously (5) but 
within the range reported in other Ebola outbreaks (1,2). In 
addition, patients’ symptoms were similar to those reported 
previously, except for the manifestation of bleeding, which 
occurred >2× more often than during the SEBOV outbreak 
in Gulu in 2000 (5).
The  Bundibugyo ebolavirus outbreak (CFR 34%) 
caused a lower proportion of deaths than did the SEBOV 
outbreak in Gulu (CFR 53%) (5). Similarly, the CFR for 
the Bundibugyo outbreak was lower than that reported 
from other outbreaks outside Uganda (1,2), which indicates 
either that the new virus strain may be less virulent or that 
improved interventions led to more timely case identiﬁ  ca-
tion and better case management.
During the Bundibugyo outbreak, vital functions were 
sustained by supportive treatment, including administer-
ing antipyretics, monitoring ﬂ  uid balance, and giving an-
tibacterial or antimalarial drugs for concurrent bacterial or 
protozoal infections. Oral rehydration and oral administra-
tion of antibacterial drugs were encouraged for all patients, 
provided they were conscious and not vomiting; otherwise, 
ﬂ  uids and antibiotics were administered intravenously. To 
streamline case detection, village health teams and am-
bulance teams were trained early to conduct active case 
search and referral. Strict isolation measures included the 
establishment of triage in all health facilities, designation 
Table 3. Bivariate analysis of risk factors for Ebola viral hemorrhagic fever, Bundibugyo district, Uganda, 2007–2008* 
Potential risk factor 
Probable case, 
n = 74 
Confirmed
case, n = 42 
Probable/confirmed 
case, n = 116 
Noncase,
n = 76 (ref.) 
Hospitalized/visited hospital, no. (%)  38 (51.40)  36 (85.70)  74 (63.79)  31 (40.80) 
  OR (95% CI)  1.5 (0.8–3.1)  8.7 (3.0–26.3) 2.6 (1.4–4.9) 1
 p  value  0.2 <0.001 <0.05
Consulted traditional healer, no. (%)  1 (1.4)  0 1 (0.9)  4 (5.3) 
  OR (95% CI)  0.25 (0.01–2.4)  Undefined  0.2 (0.01–1.5) 1
 p  value  0.2 0.06
Participated in funeral rituals, no. (%)  43 (58.1)  32 (76.2)  75 (64.7)  23 (30.2) 
 OR  (95%  CI)  3.2 (1.6–6.6) 7.4 (2.9–19.3) 4.22 (2.2–8.2) 1
 p  value  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Traveled before illness, no. (%)  29 (39.20) 11 (26.20)  40 (34.50) 15 (19.74) 
 OR  (95%  CI)  2.62 (1.2–5.8) 1.4 (0.5–3.8)  2.1 (1.0–4.5) 1
 p  value  <0.05 0.03
Had contact with person with known suspected case, no. (%)  48 (64.90)  42 (100.00)  90 (77.60)  43 (56.58) 
  OR (95% CI)  1.4 (0.7–2.9)  Undefined  2.7 (1.35–5.24) 1
 p  value  0.3 <0.05
Had contact with wildlife, no. (%)  1 (1.4)  0 1 (0.9)  1 (1.3) 
  OR (95% CI)  1.0 (0.0–38.4)  Undefined  0.7 (0.02–24.30)  1
 p  value  1.0 0.8
Male sex, no. (%)  40 (54.00)  25 (59.52)  65 (56.00)  37 (29.31) 
  OR (95% CI)  1.2 (0.6–2.5)  1.6 (0.7–3.6)  1.3 (0.7–2.5)  1
 p  value  0.5 0.3 0.3
Age 41–60 y, no. (%)  18 (24.30)  16 (38.10)  34 (0.90)  18 (1.32) 
  OR (95% CI)  1.0 (0.5–2.3)  2.0 (0.8–4.9)  1.3 (0.7–2.7)  1
 p  value  0.9 0.1 0.4
*Ref., reference; OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval. Boldface indicates significant associations. RESEARCH
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of isolation wards, training of healthcare workers in adher-
ence to standard precautions, barrier nursing, supervised 
burial, and ambulance services.
During the Bundibugyo outbreak, case-patients were 
more likely than non–case-patients to have participated 
in funeral rituals. The practice exposes contacts to infec-
tious body ﬂ  uids that have been associated with acquiring 
EHF (4).
Fourteen health workers were infected during the 
Bundibugyo outbreak before strict isolation procedures 
were initiated. During the SEBOV outbreak in Gulu, 64% 
of health workers were infected after isolation wards were 
established (14).
The outbreak response had 2 challenges and at least 1 
limitation. Investigations at the local and national levels were 
conducted in a timely manner, but the lack of capacity for 
laboratory conﬁ  rmation delayed initial outbreak conﬁ  rma-
tion and therefore the initiation of an appropriate response. 
Because hunting in the national parks is illegal, attempts to 
link the Bundibugyo outbreak to wildlife were futile because 
none of the families investigated admitted to participating 
in hunting. The use of hospitalized patients as a comparison 
group was economical, but their illnesses could have been 
related to risk factors for Bundibugyo ebolavirus infection, 
hence rendering those risk factors undetectable.
We recommend that an index of suspicion for Ebola 
viruses (and Marburg virus) be maintained for clusters of 
cases with fever of sudden onset, intense fatigue, abdomi-
nal upsets, and evidence of person-to-person transmission. 
In concert with timely initiation of active case searching, 
use of ambulance and burial teams, and strict adherence 
to patient isolation practices, an index of suspicion should 
ensure mitigation of the identiﬁ  ed risk factors. 
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